Recent reports indicate that Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems have effectively compromised the effectiveness of U.S. precision-guided munitions supplied to Ukraine. These advances in Russian EW capabilities highlight the challenges faced by GPS-reliant weaponry in contemporary conflict zones.
During a CSIS event, Pentagon acquisition chief Bill LaPlante disclosed the failure of a ground-launched version of an air-to-ground weapon developed rapidly for Ukraine. This weapon, which is likely the Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB), failed to reach its targets, partly due to Russian electromagnetic warfare interference. “When you send something to people in the fight of their lives that just doesn’t work, they’ll try it three times and they’ll just throw it aside,” LaPlante remarked, suggesting Ukraine’s diminishing interest in the munition.
The GLSDB, boasting a range of 90 miles, had been designed to leverage GPS and inertial navigation systems for target acquisition. This method, however, has proven vulnerable. Daniel Patt of the Hudson Institute, during congressional testimony in March, emphasized the significant decline in effectiveness of GPS-guided Excalibur rounds—from 70% to 6%—over a few months due to Russian EW. The Hudson Institute also referenced Jack Watling of RUSI, who found that Russian EW attacks have deviated GMLRS missiles off course and successfully countered GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs).
Russian EW tactics employ GPS spoofers which broadcast false location data to GPS devices, often overpowering the original signals due to their relative weakness. The ease of creating such spoofers with contemporary technology poses a substantial threat to the GPS-dependent armaments that were largely designed in a pre-spoofing era.
Electronic countermeasures deployed by Russia saturate the front lines. According to Bryan Clark, every six to nine miles, truck-mounted systems focus on jamming drones. Despite these challenges, there are munitions in the U.S. arsenal, such as the Harpoon missile, that remain less susceptible to GPS spoofing. Additionally, Clark suggests that Ukraine could consider jamming Russian systems, which utilize guidance akin to the JDAM’s, and therefore can be similarly misled.
The sophistication of Russian EW capabilities has prompted considerations for alternative deployment strategies and munitions. For instance, the U.S. could supply more advanced munitions, like the JASSM, which have not been provided due to their longer range and the political implications of potentially striking targets within Russia.
One potential workaround involves launching weapons from F-16 fighter jets. Ukrainian pilots are currently flying Soviet-era aircraft incapable of transferring navigational data to JDAMs. In contrast, F-16s possess this capability. Ukrainian pilots are expected to be trained on F-16s by the end of the year, potentially allowing for more accurate munition deployment.
And Ukraine is “fielding some systems now” for electronic warfare targeting of satellite navigation, Clark said. Still, since Russia is targeting civilian populations, “they may not care that much if they get spoofed.”
Relevant articles:
– Another US precision-guided weapon falls prey to Russian electronic warfare, US says , Defense One, 04/29/2024
– Russian missiles strike Ukrainian power plants in new blow to infrastructure, The Washington Post, Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:55:00 GMT
– Ukraine-Russia war live: Kyiv’s troops forced back by intense fighting in east as Putin’s soldiers advance, Yahoo Singapore News, Sun, 28 Apr 2024 11:53:37 GMT
– Ukraine-Russia war live: Kyiv’s troops forced back by intense fighting in east as Putin’s soldiers advance, Yahoo News UK, Sun, 28 Apr 2024 04:27:18 GMT