The question of what a Russian victory in Ukraine would entail has been a topic of considerable debate among policymakers and strategists worldwide. As the conflict endures, the far-reaching implications of such an outcome weigh heavily on international relations, regional stability, and global order.
A Russian victory, as understood by Western officials, implies the defeat of Ukraine’s Armed Forces. There is growing recognition that such a scenario would not translate to Russia’s interests nor constitute a desired or expected endgame for Russian leadership. The sweeping victory, which implies occupying the entirety of Ukraine, carries prohibitive costs and risks provoking a durable insurgency similar to the post-World War II Ukrainian Insurgent Army.
French President Emmanuel Macron has openly expressed that Russia must not win in Ukraine, Macron’s rhetoric, sometimes bordering on alarmist. In a world of complex geopolitics, Russia’s strategic goals appear to extend beyond Ukrainian borders, seeking concessions from the West, such as limitations on NATO expansion and force deployments, rather than territorial aggrandizement.
The unfolding conflict has prompted the largest NATO drills since the Cold War along the alliance’s eastern flank. Countries like Lithuania, acutely aware of the stakes, have rallied in support of Ukraine, understanding that Russia’s war aims, if realized, could have existential implications for the Baltic states and Europe at large.
“If we want to hit 3.5 percent of GDP on defense,” one Lithuanian official who requested anonymity told us, “we can buy lots of artillery shells or just a few F-35s.” European countries overly dependent on the United States may fail to invest adequately in their own defense industries.
In light of these concerns, a Russian victory in Ukraine would be far from a clean sweep. Occupying all of Ukraine would be a daunting task for Russia, with the West likely escalating its support for partisan activities, potentially mirroring the Afghan mujahideen resistance against the Soviet invasion in the 1980s. It would also heighten the risk of a direct clash between Russia and the West, with the specter of Western intervention looming should Kyiv’s defenses collapse.
This precarious situation underscores the Kremlin’s awareness that its wartime goals are unattainable through unilateral military triumphs. Moscow has suggested negotiating demilitarized buffer zones, using its battlefield advantages as leverage instead of pursuing conquest.
The delayed delivery of arms to Ukraine, as noted by NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, has had severe consequences on the battlefield. The US and Europe must provide Ukraine with the necessary tools to resist Russian aggression to defend its sovereignty and protect the wider European security structure.
Relevant articles:
– What a Russian ‘victory’ would actually look like , Responsible Statecraft, 05/08/2024
– Dispatch from Vilnius: Allies still waiting for the ‘Long Telegram’ from Washington, Atlantic Council, 05/06/2024
– NATO chief slams slow delivery of arms for Ukraine, Yahoo Singapore News, 05/05/2024
– Ukraine’s first lady Olena Zelenska tells UK parliament: ‘Victory is not the only thing we need. We need justice’, Yahoo Lifestyle Australia, 05/06/2024
– Commemorating the 79th Anniversary of Victory Day in Russia, News Ghana, 05/06/2024