The Islamic State (IS) group has been trying to revive its propaganda machine and attract a new generation of followers, according to French intelligence. But what can be learned from the past experiences of counterinsurgency warfare against such groups?
A book by David Galula, a French military intelligence officer who fought in the Algerian War of Independence, offers some insights into the complex dynamics of such conflicts. Galula’s book, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, is considered one of the most influential works on population-centric counterinsurgency, a strategy that focuses on winning the support of the local people rather than just killing the enemy.
Galula was trained at the École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr, the prestigious French military academy, and had a diverse set of military assignments. He observed the Chinese communists in the 1940s and 1950s, and later volunteered to command a combat unit in Algeria, where France was fighting a guerrilla war against the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), which sought independence from colonial rule.
The author said that he wanted to “test certain theories that I had formed on counterinsurgency warfare” while fighting in Algeria. His book, published in 1964, draws on his first-hand experience and outlines his vision for counterinsurgency, which includes four main steps: clear the area of insurgents, occupy the area and prevent the return of insurgents, organize the area politically and economically, and transfer the responsibility to the local authorities.
In the book, the importance of understanding the local culture, history, and politics, and of building trust and legitimacy with the population is also stressed. He argued that the counterinsurgent must act as a “political leader, a social reformer, an economist, an educator, and a psychologist” as well as a soldier.
The Algerian War, which lasted from 1954 to 1962, was a complex and brutal conflict that involved not only the FLN and France, but also mutinous generals, French-Algerian settlers, and a shadowy terrorist group called the Secret Army Organization (OAS), which opposed Algerian independence and carried out indiscriminate attacks.
The FLN, which still rules Algeria today, was not a monolithic or noble movement, but a cauldron of leader ambitions and jealousies that precipitated brutal violence. The FLN tortured and executed thousands of its own fighters and supporters, and ruthlessly targeted its rivals and the civilian population. French intelligence exploited the paranoia and divisions within the FLN and sparked a series of purges that killed thousands more.
The historical context of the Algerian War provides a backdrop to the current situation, where IS propaganda is gaining traction among a new generation. IS, which emerged from the chaos of the Iraq and Syria wars, has been trying to reassert itself after losing most of its territory and fighters. The group has been producing and disseminating online videos, magazines, and podcasts that glorify its violent ideology and actions, and that appeal to the grievances and aspirations of its potential recruits.
The lessons learned from past counterinsurgency efforts and the complex dynamics of such conflicts are crucial in understanding and addressing the current challenge posed by IS and its propaganda. Galula’s book, Counterinsurgency, offers some valuable insights into the nature and strategy of such warfare, and the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the people.
Relevant articles:
– David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (1964)
– ‘A War to the Death’: The Ugly Underside of an Iconic Insurgency
– Mind the Gap: The Perception and Reality of Communist Sabotage of …