War, as conceptualized by the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, is a multifaceted phenomenon that transcends mere tactical engagements to encompass the complexities of politics, human nature, and the unforeseen variables that inevitably arise during conflict. Today, we revisit the ever-pertinent theories of Clausewitz, whose work continues to be foundational in strategic studies and military education, to underscore the consequences of misconstruing a vital tenet: the notion that war is a continuation of policy “by other means,” not “with other means.”
Souchon, a German scholar and founder of the Clausewitz Network for Strategic Studies, provides a detailed exegesis of Clausewitz’s principles, demonstrating their timeless relevance in understanding 21st-century conflicts.
The heart of Clausewitz’s strategic thought rests in the trinity of reason, chance, and passion. He proposed that the war’s nature is dynamic, floating among these three aspects, which he termed the “Fascinating Trinity.” This intellectual construct forces one to consider war in three dimensions: the government’s rationality, the blind natural forces of primordial violence, and the play of chance and probability in which the creative spirit roams freely.
A strategic error, such as misquoting Clausewitz’s famous phrase, can have far-reaching implications. It may blur the line between war and peace, as well as between military action and political strategy. To say that war is a continuation of policy “with other means” suggests an indiscriminate mixture of political maneuvers and military actions, potentially leading to a strategic quagmire where the two spheres are indistinguishable.
Souchon emphasizes the primacy of policy in strategy, where war plans, or military strategies, must serve the political objective. These plans, according to Clausewitz’s model, should flow from a rational analysis that balances the political purpose against the necessary military means. Clausewitz insists on a meticulous war planning process that anticipates the friction, probabilities, and chance encounters of war. He notes that commanders must act with reason, guided by both the virtues of their forces and the political purpose at hand. This underscores the importance of adhering to the correct interpretation of Clausewitz’s philosophy.
Clausewitz’s influence extends beyond the theoretical realm, as seen in historical and modern-day military practice. In “On War,” he discusses the limited role of geometry in strategy, distinguishing it from its importance in tactics and fortification. Here, Clausewitz delineates between the tactical, where time and space are compressed and immediate effects are paramount, and the strategic, where larger timescales and spaces allow for mature development of advantages gained. Misinterpretations that lean too heavily on the geometrical or formal aspect of military engagements risk oversimplifying the complex nature of strategic warfare.
The misquotation of Clausewitz acts as a microcosm of the broader issue of misunderstanding strategic principles. Such misinterpretations not only impede the proper application of military force but can also lead to flawed national security policies. By adhering closely to Clausewitz’s original texts and insights, military thinkers and commanders can craft strategies that are both informed and responsive to the unpredictable nature of war.
As we navigate the frictional environment of 21st-century conflicts, Clausewitz’s teachings remain a guiding light, not only in crafting war plans but also in ensuring that those plans are coherent extensions of political aims. Clausewitz’s insistence on reality as the starting point and end of analysis compels us to remain grounded, even as we engage in the abstract thinking necessary for strategy.
In conclusion, Clausewitz’s theories provide an intellectual scaffolding for modern strategic culture. The proper interpretation of his concept of war as a continuation of policy “by other means” is critical for separating the strategic statecraft of war from peacetime policy maneuvers, preserving the unique dynamics of each, and avoiding a strategic conflation that could distort both the conduct of war and the pursuit of peace.
Relevant articles:
– Strategy, War, and the Relevance of Carl von Clausewitz, Military Strategy Magazine, by L Souchon · Cited by 4
– Carl von Clausewitz: ON WAR. Book 3, Chapter 15, ClausewitzStudies.org